A port city in Northeast China: Dengzhou in the Long eighteenth century by Po, Ronald C.
  
Ronald C. Po 
A port city in Northeast China: Dengzhou in 
the Long eighteenth century 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: Po, Ronald C. (2017) A port city in Northeast China: Dengzhou in the Long eighteenth 
century. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. ISSN 1356-1863 
 
© 2016 The Royal Asiatic Society 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/68821/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: January 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
 1  
 
 
A Port City in Northeast China:  
Dengzhou in the Long Eighteenth Century 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“Zaiton…the port for all the ships that arrive 
from India laden with costly wares and 
precious stones…It is also the port for all the 
merchants of all the surrounding territory. 
And I can assure you that for one spice ship 
that goes to Alexandria to pick up pepper for 
export to Christendom, Zaiton is visited by a 
hundred.”1 
-- Excerpt from Marco Polo, 
“Description on Zaiton (Quanzhou),” 
in his Description of the World (1292)  
 
Although Marco Polo’s trip to China may be subject to dispute,2 he produced what has 
arguably become one of the most significant accounts of global travel in world history. After all, 
he brought Chinese civilization to the attention of the West, and his lively rendering of 
Quanzhou harbor (Zaiton) became an influential depiction of a Chinese port city for Europeans. 3 
His travelogue succeeded in introducing Europe to an important port city in China at that time, 
but excluded important coastal areas outside of Southeast China. By “Southeast China,” I refer to 
the coastal region located south of Shanghai. In fact, since the Song dynasty (960-1279), port 
cities in southeast China became famous as significant links in trans-regional sea trade between 
China and the wider world.4 Taking Shanghai as the midpoint between north and south, we are 
                                                          
1 R. Latham, The Travels of Marco Polo (Harmondsworth: Penquin, 1958), p. 237. 
 
2 See discussions in Frances Wood, Did Marco Polo go to China? (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 1996) and Hans 
Ulrich Vogel, Marco Polo was in China: New Evidence from Currencies, Salts and Revenues (Leiden: Brill, 2013). 
  
3 Wang Gungwu, The Nanhai Trade: The Early History of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea (Singapore: Times 
Academic Press, 1998): John Chaffee, “At the Intersection of Empire and World Trade: The Chinese Port City of 
Quanzhou (Zaitun), Evelenth-Fifteenth Centuries,” in Kenneth R. Hall (ed.), Secondary Cities and Urban 
Networking in the Indian Ocean Realm, c. 1400-1800 (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008), pp. 99-122; Cho-yun 
Hsu: Timothy D. Baker and Michael S. Duke (trans.), China: A New Cultural History (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), pp. 278-279; John Guy, “Tamil Merchant Guilds and the Quanzhou Trade,” in Angela 
Schottenhammer (ed.), The Emporium of the World: Maritime Quanzhou, 1000-1400 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 295; 
Edward A. Alpers, The Indian Ocean in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 63. 
 
4 See, for instance, Kenneth R. Hall, “Local and International Trade and Traders in the Straits of Melaka Region: 
600-1500,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 47, no. 2 (2004), pp. 213-260; Anthony 
Reid, “An Age of Commerce in Southeast Asian History,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 24, no. 1 (Feb, 1990), pp. 1-
30; Paul van Dyke, The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845 (Hong Kong: Hong 
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likely to be far more familiar with port cities to its south than those to its north. From the time 
when Marco Polo published his account to the time when the five treaty ports were opened to the 
British, the southeast seacoast was regarded as the gateway to China from the Far West (taixi). 
As a consequence, in discussions of coastal cities in early modern China, academic attention has 
long focused on port cities such as Shanghai, Amoy, Fuzhou, and Canton, where European, 
Islam, and Middle-east traders and travelers had direct cultural and economic interaction and 
experience. I consider this phenomenon (i.e. the focus on the coast of late imperial China) a 
“Southeast China centrism.” We have been ceaselessly swayed by this centrism from the 1950s 
and, since then, have intensively studied the coast of southeast China, to the exclusion of the 
northeast.5 There are many exciting topics related to the southeastern coast which, no doubt, 
deserve our attention; however this makes the northeastern coast seem very removed from sea 
trade and coastal management in the history of Asian port cities.6 For instance, in the fantastic 
volume edited by Frank Broeze entitled Gateways of Asia: Port Cities of Asia in the 13th-20th 
Centuries, ports along the Northeast China coast were, surprisingly, nowhere to be found in the 
entire volume.7 Although we might all concede that some southeastern seaports were vital to 
transoceanic interactions, to ignore northern port cities in connection with China and the 
maritime world in the early modern period is shortsighted. This article aims at breaking through 
the “Southeast China-centric” framework by focusing attention on a less familiar coastal seaport, 
Dengzhou. By detailing and examining the political and economic importance of this port city 
throughout the eighteenth century, I argue that the sea surrounding northeastern China was no 
less important than that in southeastern China. Even if port cities in the north might not have 
been as economically vibrant as those in the south, we should not overlook their functions and 
histories. This paper will show that northeastern cities like Dengzhou also attained unique 
patterns of development within the political and economic spectrums throughout the long 
eighteenth century. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Kong University Press, 2005), pp. 1- 4; Ralph Kauz (ed.), Aspects of the Maritime Silk Road: From the Persian Gulf 
to the East China Sea (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010). 
 
5 The maritime frontier of Northern China has not been examined comprehensively in the West. For example, Jane 
Kate Leonard published an interesting article concerning the Qing strategic vision of the maritime space on the 
northeast coast of China from a “sea transport perspective (haiyun),” but it is only a paper consists 14 pages. See 
Jane Kate Leonard, “The Qing Strategic Highway on the Northeast Coast,” in Angela Schottenhammer and 
Roderich Ptak (eds.), The Perception of Maritime Space in Traditional Chinese Sources (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 
Verlag, 2006), pp. 27-41. Christopher Agnew wrote a fascinating piece, which focuses on Dengzhou and the Bohai 
Sea from a “regional integration perspective,” but it only touches upon the period covering a few decades in the late 
Ming. See Christopher Agnew, “Dengzhou and the Bohai Gulf in Seventeenth Century Northeast Asia,” in Kenneth 
R. Hall (ed.), The Growth of Non-Western Cities: Primary and Secondary Urban Networking, c. 900-1900 (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2011), pp. 171-195. Even though the maritime frontier of north Asia were the subject of the First 
International Seminar on Commissioner Chang Pogo and Ancient Tang-Sila-Japan Maritime Relations (conference 
held in Wando, Republic of Korea, November, 1992), most of the papers have not yet been published. After all, 
other than Tianjin and Port Arthur, most of the Anglophone readers are not very familiar with the functions and 
histories of port cities in Northern China. Compared to the southern coast, the northern coast is a subject awaits 
further studies. 
  
6 In 2007, Liu Fengming also raised this concern in his Shandong bandao yu dongfang haishang sichou zhi lu 
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2007), p. 6.  
 
7  Frank Broeze (ed.), Gateways of Asia: Port Cities of Asia in the 13th-20th Centuries (London: Kegan Paul 
International, 1997). 
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I have chosen the long eighteenth century as the timeframe because it has long been 
misconstrued as a time when China had very little to do with the ocean. Other than the 
annexation of Taiwan in the 1680s and perhaps the sea blockade policy, maritime militarization 
and shipping management were rather inconspicuous features of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) 
before the arrival of western gunboats in the mid-nineteenth century. Fortunately, this perception 
is gradually being challenged by a number of prominent scholars in the field of maritime 
history.8 However, the impact of their research is, as yet, insufficient. In line with this promising 
research, I hope that the present work can serve as an example to show that the Qing was not 
simply a land-based empire in the long eighteenth century, but a sea power concerned with its 
maritime frontier as well as the development of a number of important coastal cities in the north 
and south. 
  
The Five Zones 
 
Perhaps it was the publication of John King Fairbank’s influential book, Trade and 
Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854 in 1953, that fueled 
the rise in scholarship on the urban developments and trading patterns of a number of coastal 
cities in China, especially among historians in the West. The cities that caught attention were 
primarily the five treaty ports that were forced open as a concession following China’s defeat in 
the First Opium War (1839-1942). In these five ports (Canton, Amoy, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and 
Shanghai), free trade was enforced between foreigners and Chinese merchants. The infamous 
treaty port system, symbolizing the unique diplomatic relationship between China and the West, 
is the origin of the opening of these port cities. The five port cities experienced dramatic growth 
in economic development under the treaty port system. 9  Canton, for example, quickly 
transformed into the economic center in both the Euro-Asian and Asian-Pacific markets; it was 
even considered the “wonder of the Far East,”10 where international interactions actually took 
place in pre-modern times. 11  The other four treaty ports also went through remarkable 
development featuring transcultural interaction. Because of this distinctive feature, historians 
have tended to study the urban development of these coastal cities. Scholars like Linda Cooke 
Johnson, Rhoads Murphey, and Robert Nield, to name a few, have written beautiful histories of 
                                                          
8 See, for instance, Zheng Yangwen, China on the Sea: How the Maritime World Shaped Modern China (Leiden: 
Brill, 2012); Gang Zhao, The Qing Opening to the Ocean: China Maritime Policies, 1684-1757 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2014); and Wang Wensheng, White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates: Crisis and 
Reform in the Qing Empire (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2014).  
 
9 However, as reminded by Gang Zhao, it has to be pointed out that some treaty ports had functioned as commercial 
and economic centers for more than 150 years before the arrival of western battleships. It is thus debatable to simply 
argue that the post-1840 imperialism of western seagoing merchants are the only actors that catalyzed the rise of the 
treaty ports as significant commercial centers in East Asia. See Gang Zhao, The Qing Opening to the Ocean, p. 136.  
 
10 Valery M. Garrrett labels Canton as the “wonder of the Far East” in her Heaven is High, the Emperor Far Away: 
Merchants and Mandarins in Old Canton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
 
11 David Igler, The Great Ocean: Pacific Worlds from Captain Cook to the Gold Rush (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), pp. 30-33.  
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these places.12 Their research has not only shed light on the histories of the cities themselves but 
has enlightened numerous subsequent studies of these sea ports. As many scholars have argued, 
the coast of Southeast China assuredly had a dynamism that helps us better understand the 
history of late imperial China as well as early modern global history.13  
 
The coast of Southeast China is no doubt worth studying; but, as I have argued, this is a 
more or less Southeast China-centric way to conceptualize China’s coast. This framework may 
be useful in opening the window to various kinds of economic and cultural exchanges between 
different peoples, but it keeps us from getting a comprehensive picture of the East Asian 
maritime world, because significant bodies of water attached to China, such as the Bohai and the 
Yellow Seas, somehow elude discussion. I think it is about time to shift our attention from south 
to north in order to generate a better picture of China’s coast during the long eighteenth century.  
 
By early 1977, the American historical anthropologist William G. Skinner (1925-2008) 
had already divided China into nine macro-regions according to the drainage basins of the major 
rivers and other geomorphological features that constrained travel.14 Five of nine regions were 
linked to the ocean, while two macro-regions, Manchuria and North China, were linked to the 
northeastern coast (see figure 1). Skinner’s model is compelling in having broadly stimulated 
area studies over the past few decades. But I do not apply this model in this paper, simply 
because it is very land-based. Instead, I propose dividing the seas along the coast of China into 
five discrete, yet interlinked, maritime zones: (1) The Bohai zone, (2) the Jiangsu sea zone, (3) 
the Zhejiang sea zone, (4) the Taiwan Strait, and (5) the Guangdong sea zone. This five-zone 
model derives from a coastal map (haitu) entitled Qisheng yanhai tu (The Coastal Map of Seven 
Coastal Provinces) officially produced in the late eighteenth century and reprinted subsequently 
in the nineteenth century. The nineteenth century edition of this coastal map introduces “dividing 
lines (fenjie)” between specific maritime spaces (see figure 2). These dividing lines indicate that 
specific maritime spaces were policed and governed by their respective coastal provinces. 
Breaking down the maritime frontier of the Qing Empire into the same divisions that were used 
at that time is perhaps the best way to study the maritime policies, consciousness, and ideologies 
in question. Understanding the development of coastal China in the late imperial period may also 
help us escape the Euro-centric framework.  
 
                                                          
12 Linda Cooke Johnson, Shanghai: From Market Town to Treaty Port, 1074-1858 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1995); Rhoads Murphey, “The Treaty Ports and China’s Modernization,” in Mark Elvin and William G. 
Skinner (eds.), The Chinese City between Two Worlds (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 17-72; and 
Robert Nield, The China Coast: Trade and the First Treaty Ports (Joint Publishing Co. Ltd., 2010), pp. 92-251.  
 
13  See Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 57; Craig Lockard, Societies, Networks, and Transitions: A Global 
History (Stanford: Cengage Learning, 2008), p. 632; Takeshi Hamashita, “Editor’s Introduction,” in his China, East 
Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 1-11.  
 
14  William G. Skinner, “Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth Century,” in The City in Late Imperial China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), pp. 212-215. 
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Figure 1. The Skinner Model 
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Figure 2. Example of “dividing lines (fenjie)” 
(Map: Qisheng yanhai tu; 19th century edition) 
 
Using the five-zone model, the Bohai zone is of particular concern not only in helping us 
shift our academic focus “from south to north,” but because the Qing court valued it in a 
deliberate manner throughout the long eighteenth century. As the only maritime space 
connecting three coastal provinces with very different customs and cultures, the Bohai Sea was 
the maritime gateway leading to the capital region (jingji) and the homeland of the Manchu 
ruling elite. It was also the maritime space that connected the Chinese capital to Korea, the 
nearest neighboring state. Transcultural interactions between Chinese, Korean, and Japanese 
merchants, intellectuals, and even pirates across the Bohai zone were no less dynamic and 
vibrant than those in the southeastern maritime region. The Bohai zone was also notable for its 
extensive maritime resources. As Jiang Chenying notes in his Haifang zonglun (A comprehensive 
study on maritime defense), the Bohai Sea was famous for sea-salt production and a variety of 
fishery products from the Ming onwards.15 In his Dushi fangyu jiyao (Essence of historical 
geography), Gu Zuyu also noted the bountiful sea-salt and seafood production across the Bohai 
Sea, explaining how it contributed significantly to the prosperous coastal economy along 
northeast China.16 In fact, beginning in the eighteenth century, significant maritime resources 
(e.g. sea salt) as well as some trading goods produced in northeast China (e.g. soybean paste) 
                                                          
15 Jiang Chenying, Haifang zonglun (Beijing: Zhishi chanquan chubanshe, 2011), 5b. 
 
16 Gu Zuyu, Dushi fangyu jiyao (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005), juan 24, 7a. 
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were shipped to other parts of China from the Bohai region.17 The Bohai zone was therefore 
considered to be both a strategic corridor to the open sea and a natural buffer for the region 
surrounding the Qing capital. 
 
The two best known port cities in the Bohai zone are arguably Tianjin and Port Arthur – 
probably because, once again, they were forcefully opened by western imperialistic powers for 
free trade in the late nineteenth century. Instead of these two port cities, I choose to study 
Dengzhou, a relatively small and less familiar seaport located in the northern part of Shandong. 
Despite its size, this port city remained politically and economically important for some time in 
the eighteenth century. In the pre-modern era, Dengzhou experienced ups and downs in its 
development, like other coastal cities (not just in China, but all over the world). Once an 
economic harbor thronged with traders from all over northeast Asia, it was a fortified naval base 
established by the Qing court in the early eighteenth century. But it was overshadowed by 
another coastal city in later years. Then, in the late nineteenth century, it gained importance once 
again for a variety of reasons. In order to better comprehend these political and economic 
changes, we will travel back to late imperial Dengzhou in the sections that follow. In the first 
section we will briefly introduce the city’s geographical location and its history prior to the Qing 
dynasty. Then we will examine the maritime militarization of Dengzhou and the Bohai area. In 
the final session, we will inquire into the city’s maritime commerce and its economic 
significance within the Northeast Asian network.  
 
The City 
 
To southern Chinese and especially to foreigners, Dengzhou may be less familiar than 
Suzhou, Fuzhou, or Guangzhou, the famed centers of Jiangnan and Guangdong cultures, which 
feature on so many tourist routes. But to people in northeastern China and especially the natives 
in Shandong, Dengzhou carries rich historical associations. The Northern Song historian Ye Shi 
described Dengzhou as a strategic harbor connecting the world beyond the Song Empire. As he 
noted, “the city is surrounded on three sides by the sea. During the reign [of northern Song], the 
assorted maritime states that presented tribute to the Emperor in Beijing all came through 
Denglai.”18 The Qing literati Gu Zuyu also valued Dengzhou as the place that “controls the 
safety across the Bohai Gulf as well as the Yellow Sea region.”19  
 
 Known as Penglai today, Dengzhou is a coastal city situated in the northern Shandong 
Peninsula. Its description in the gazetteer Dengzhou fuzhi, as well as evidence in modern atlases, 
gives us a reasonably good sense of the general topography of the area. The city lies more than a 
hundred miles from the nearest coastal city, Yantai, and almost five hundred miles from 
                                                          
17 See Liu Sufen, “Qingzhao zhongye beiyang de haiyun,” in Wu Jiangxiong (ed.), Zhongguo haiyang fazhan 
lunwenji, vol. 4, (Taipei: Research Center for Humanities and Social Science, Academia Sinica, 1991), pp. 101-124. 
Chen Lihua even argued that Dengzhou already established its close connection with Fujian in the Tang Song 
transition in terms of trade and commerce. See her “Tang Song zhiji Dengzhou gang de fanrong yu Fujian haishang 
jiaotong de fazhan,” Journal of Teacher College (Qingdao University), vol. 25 no. 2 (June, 2008), pp. 38-43.  
 
18 On the discussion of strategic importance of some port cities in Shandong, see Liu Fengming, Shandong bandao 
yu dongfang haishang sichou zhi lu (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2007), p. 203. 
 
19 Gu Zuyu, Dushi fangyu jiyao, juan 24, 7a. 
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Weihaiwei. Off the northern coast of Dengzhou lies the Miaodao archipelago, or the Long island, 
which comprises 32 small islands famous for their stunning scenery. In the eighteenth century, it 
was said to take less than a day to reach the Liaodong Peninsula from Dengzhou through the 
Miaodao archipelago. Dengzhou was also located close to Korean terrain. As recorded in the 
Official History of the Sui Dynasty, Dengzhou was the point of departure where the Emperor 
Yang of Sui mobilized his navy to attack Korea. The land to the south and southwest of 
Dengzhou is flat; but farming is difficult. The nearest inland commercial center is Laizhou, a 
traditional city that benefited considerably from its abundant natural resources, such as gold, 
magnetite, and granite. In the Ming and Qing, Laizhou was closely linked to Dengzhou and 
Fushan in the east and Qingzhou in the west, within the Shandong transport and postal system. 
Troops and cavalries could effectively be mobilized from the west (Qingzhou) to the east 
(Dengzhou and other coastal cities). Although Dengzhou, as such, was only a harbor with limited 
natural resources and relatively small population (diji minpin),20 it had good east-west land and 
water communications, because it was closely connected to other big urban cities.  
 
 
Figure 3. Deng Jin Shan Ning sizhen haitu (Ming edition; National Palace Museum) 
                                                          
20 Fang Ruyi, Jia Hu, et. al., Guangxu zeng xiu Dengzhou fuzhi (Nanjing: Fenghuang chubanshe, 2004), p. 73.   
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Figure 4. Bohai yanan daoli tu (ca. 18th century edition; National Palace Museum) 
 
 
Figure 5.  Dengzhou fujing tu (Shunzhi edition) 
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Some archeologists have argued that the Shandong peninsula was first settled in the 
remote past;21 but the picture of Dengzhou in ancient times is still fragmentary and far less clear 
than one would wish. We are certain that, from the Tang period, over the centuries geo-political 
factors became critical determinants of the historical development of this small coastal city.22 
Geographically located at the tip of the northern Shandong peninsula, it was ideally situated as 
the commercial site for trade with the ports of Liaodong in the north, such as Lushun and Jinzhou. 
Embraced by the Bohai Gulf and naturally protected by the Miaodao archipelago, it became a 
desirable naval base from which to extend military control over the Bohai region. Enjoying these 
geopolitical advantages, Dengzhou served as one of the designated sea ports of entry for foreign 
tribute and trade missions in the Sui and Tang dynasties. Throughout the Tang era, it was a point 
of access for foreign dignitaries and traders (mostly Japanese and Korean) to enter the Chinese 
empire.23 This continued to be the case into Song times. As recorded in the Korean archive, the 
Annals of the Joseon Dynasty, several officials from the Korean state of Silla were allowed to 
hold military and administrative posts in Dengzhou in order to protect their traders and citizens.24 
This record suggests that Dengzhou served as a significant station that connected China and 
Korea politically and economically. Later in the 1020s, however, Dengzhou gradually lost its 
significance in foreign sea trade. The Northern Song government banned foreign vessels from 
landing in Dengzhou out of fear that the Korean merchants would support the expansive Liao 
state in the north by shipping weapons and other supplies through the city. 25  Since the 
enforcement of a trade ban required a strong military commitment, Dengzhou was quickly 
transformed from a trading port to a military settlement guarded by roughly three to four 
thousands soldiers.26  
 
During the Yuan dynasty, Dengzhou regained its importance in foreign sea trade. Its 
geographical location remained a magnet for overseas traders interested in the North China 
market. Apart from fostering foreign sea trade between China, Korea, and Japan, Dengzhou 
served as a port for the transportation of grain boats from South China. Its location on the north-
south coastal route made it the equivalent of Zhejiang and Suzhou for North China in the 
thirteenth century. Although the exact quantity of goods imported from the south, mainly from 
the Jiangnan area, is uncertain, a Yuan dynasty poet described the bustling harbor near Dengzhou 
                                                          
21 For instance, see Richard Pearson and Anne Underhill, “The Chinese Neolithic: Recent Trends in Research,” 
American Anthropologist: vol. 89, No. 4 (Dec., 1987), pp. 807-822; Li Liu, “State Emergence in Early China,” 
Annual Review of Anthropology, vol. 38 (2009), pp. 217-232; see also the website “Weihai: City History, Ancient 
Relics, Archaeological Tours” (http://www.weihai-hotels.com/en/history.html).  
 
22 See Wang Saishi, Shandong yanhai kaifa shi (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 2005), pp. 136-143; Fan Wenli, “Tangdai 
Dengzhou haixing ru Gaoli dao de bianqian yu Chishan fahuayuan de xingcheng,” Zhongguo lishi dili luncong, vol. 
20, no. 5 (2005), pp. 114-125.  
 
23 Edwin O. Reischauer, “Notes on Tang Dynasty Sea Routes,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol. 5 no. 2 
(June, 1940), pp. 142-164.  
 
24 Liu Fengming, Shandong bandao yu dongfang haishang sichou zhi lu, pp. 231-247. 
 
25 Zhang Zhaodong, Song Yuan Shandong quyi jingji yanjiu (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 2006), pp. 175-180.  
 
26 Dengzhou fuzhi, juan 13, 6b-7a.  
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as “flooded by porcelain and pots from Jiangsu and cloth from Zhejiang.”27 For more than two 
centuries Dengzhou, on the one hand, maintained itself as the principle sea port where travelers 
and traders gathered to ship and unload their cargoes, on the other, it served as the northern 
terminus of the grain boats network along the coast of China. Nevertheless, Dengzhou was not 
simply a trading post in the Yuan dynasty. It was at the same time a military harbor supporting 
the Mongol invasions of the Japanese islands in 1274 and 1281 during Kublai Khan’s rule. As a 
result, Dengzhou gained a considerable military population. More men were stationed in the city 
to construct and refine war junks on a regular basis. The navy based in Dengzhou was also 
responsible for eradicating pirates, both Chinese and Japanese, who threatened the Bohai area. 28 
 
With the initiation of sea ban on private coastal trade in the early Ming, the development 
of Dengzhou took a new turn. It significantly weakened the place of Dengzhou in the merchant 
networks of northeast Asia. However, restrictions on sea trade were not as effective as 
expected,29 so the Ming court restricted local engagement in merchant transport by establishing 
more coastal garrisons along the coast. Dengzhou’s military apparatus was hence strengthened 
qualitatively and quantitatively, as recorded in the Account of Naval Exercise in Penglai (Penglai 
ge yue shuicao ji) written by Xu Ji,30 Even though Dengzhou was not as prominent in maritime 
commerce in the early Ming as it had been before, it became a well-fortified military harbor in 
northern Shandong.31 The city was not the only seaport that experienced military enlargement, 
however. Almost the entire coastline of Shandong, including Yantai, Weihai, and Qingdao, 
similarly underwent coastal militarization, with the aim of undermining pirates, smugglers, and 
unlicensed traders.32 Dengzhou only re-emerged as a key port in regional sea trade network of 
the greater Bohai region when the sea ban was abolished in 1567. In the late Ming and early 
Qing dynasties that followed, most of the commercial goods from Korea were shipped to China 
via Dengzhou. The port city’s growth is illustrated by the dramatic increase in the number of 
Korean merchants in Dengzhou between the early sixteenth and the mid-seventeenth centuries.33 
Yet because the Ming court aimed to govern the coastal region in a precautionary manner, 
Dengzhou retained its military importance. As a result, the size of the garrisons in Shandong and 
Dengzhou grew substantially between the mid- and late- Ming. For example, in 1592, 
immediately following the first invasion of the Korean peninsula by the Japanese warlord 
                                                          
 
27 Dengzhou gugang shi bianwei hui, Dengzhou gugang shi (Beijing: Renmin jiaotong chubanshe, 1994), p. 96.  
 
28 Chi Jinguang, Sun Yanyan, “Dengzhou gang zai Zhongguo junshi shi shang de diwei,” Shandong Dang’an, vol. 5 
(2008), pp. 66-67. 
 
29 Chao Zhongchen, Mingdai haijin yu haiwai maoyi (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2005), pp. 132-138.  
 
30 Xu Ji, Penglai ge yue shuicao ji.  
 
31  Liaoning sheng dang’an guan (ed.), Zhongguo Mingchao dang’an zonghui (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue 
chubanshe, 2001), vol. 7, pp. 452-475.  
32 Dong Jian, “Mingchao Dengzhou haifang jianshe gaishu,” Journal of Nanchang College of Education, vol. 27, 
no.5  (2012), p. 194.  
 
33 Yi Man-song, Gye he jo chen rok, in Im Ki-jung (ed.), Yonhaengnok chonjip (Seoul: Tongguk Taehakkyo 
Ch’ulp’anbu, 2001), vol. 14, p. 315.  
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Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598), the Wanli Emperor (r. 1572-1620) deployed 6,700 soldiers to 
the Jinan and Dengzhou garrisons. Dengzhou at that time had the duty to safeguard the maritime 
frontier from subsequent Japanese invasions and to provide necessary military support to other 
cities within the Bohai region (Bohai quyu).34 Until the seventeenth and the eighteenth century, 
Dengzhou continued to maintain its position as a military harbor. As the Korean emissary Yi 
Min-song recorded in 1623 when he reached the Temple Island (Miaodao), just off the coast of 
Dengzhou, “I see fire signal stations established on each island peak, within sight of one another. 
Agricultural officers for the fields of the military settlements (tuntian nongmu) are everywhere. 
The war junks and merchant ships anchored along the coast are uncountable.”35 Yi’s account 
succinctly indicates a strong naval presence in Dengzhou. The city was evidently regarded as a 
strategic outpost within the context of Ming military coastal policies.   
 
The above discussion, though admittedly brief, is sufficient to show that Dengzhou, 
despite its smaller size and population, was an important and strategic coastal city which 
inevitably played a major role in the maritime history of Northeast China. Dengzhou’s 
continuous militarily and economic development from the Tang to the Ming, due to a set of geo-
political factors, is also clear. Now it is essential to discuss in more detail the means and extent to 
which Dengzhou was maintained as a significant military harbor and coastal city within the high 
Qing maritime governing policies during the long eighteenth century. 
 
Maritime Militarization 
 
The political instability of the late Ming was apparent throughout the Shandong peninsula, 
and was accompanied by social and economic crises. In the 1620s, the peninsula was ravaged by 
drought, famine, and misfortune, which gave rise to a host of internal rebellions affecting 
Dengzhou. According to an official stationed in Dengzhou in the 1630s,  
 
the city of Deng[zhou] abuts the seacoast where bandit evildoers always make 
their lairs. The land of the city is rocky, and no crops flourish or grow well. For 
these reasons, many people are poor. Since they are poor they are easily 
motivated to commit crime in order to fulfill their basic needs. The use of military 
force to ensure order is critical.36  
 
In 1631, the Ming commander Kong Youde (?-1652), leading his troops in mutiny, seized the 
city of Dengzhou and proceeded to establish an independent military regime on the Shandong 
peninsula. Although Kong’s authority survived for only one year, the rebellion and the 
subsequent Ming government campaign to suppress it severely devastated Dengzhou. As Chen 
Zhongshang, a newly appointed magistrate, described, “when I first looked out over all of 
                                                          
34 Liaoning sheng dang’an guan (ed.), Zhongguo Mingchao dang’an zonghui, vol. 7, p. 211.  
 
35 Yi Man-song, Gye he jo chen rok, p. 335.  
 
36 Chen Zhongsheng, “Dengzhou fu xinjian chayuan ji,” collected in the Daoguang chong xiu Penglai xian zhi 
(Nanjing: Fenghuang chubanshe, 2004), vol. 12, p. 225.  
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Dengzhou I saw only bleak wasteland, overgrowth, collapsed walls, and broken roof tiles. I felt 
despair……the sights and sounds of the animals, crops, tourists, and entertainers, once seen and 
heard throughout the area, will probably never be known again.”37 
 
As the famine in Shandong continued in the last few years of the Ming, starving refugees 
were dying on the roads around Dengzhou. Men and women committed suicide and the city 
slowly disintegrated. 38  In February 1636, eight years before Beijing fell to the Qing, the 
Manchus annexed the decaying Dengzhou. Yet Dengzhou did not revive as a flourishing sea port 
after the takeover. Seventeen years later, Dengzhou became the center of a disturbance. In 1661, 
a peasant rebellion against the Qing led by Yu Qi, a native of Shandong, broke out in Shandong 
near Dengzhou. The rebellion escalated out of control along the Shandong littoral. Yu Qi and his 
followers captured Dengzhou and turned the city into a stronghold for their anti-Manchus 
campaign. The anti-Qing character of this added a new sense of political urgency to the threat of 
domestic crisis. This compelled the Qing court to develop new strategies to suppress rebellion as 
quickly as possible, and it took less than a year for the Qing to bring Dengzhou back into its 
fold.39 After Dengzhou was recaptured in 1675, the pragmatic Emperor Kangxi began increasing 
the maritime militarization of Dengzhou in order to strengthen the military capability of the 
Bohai region. The emperor ordered that additional soldiers be added to the Dengzhou naval base, 
which was first established by the Shunzhi Emperor in 1644. The structure of the navy was also 
reorganized. Consisting of almost 1200 soldiers and 20 war junks and patrol boats, it was divided 
into two specific teams: the “front team (qianying),” and the “back team (houying)”. The former 
was responsible for policing the sea space between Dengzhou and Ninghaizhou in the east, while 
the latter was ordered to police the sea space between Dengzhou and Laizhou in the west. In 
order to further expand the zone of policing, the qianying was relocated to Jiaozhou in 1706 and 
renamed the Jiaozhou navy (Jiaozhou shuishi), whereas the houying continued to be stationed in 
Dengzhou. At that time, the sea in southern Shandong was patrolled by the Jiaozhou navy, while 
the sea surrounding northern Shandong, including a significant part of the Bohai Sea, remained 
under the control of the Dengzhou navy (the Dengzhou shuishi), which was considered large and 
solid.40 As an anonymous writer in the early Qing noted, compared to its structure in the Ming, 
the navy was effective in attacking seafaring targets (mainly pirates) across the waiyang sector, 
thereby preventing intruding vessels from entering the harbor. 41  However, there was no 
consensus in the navy as to where intruders should be confronted. Some officials argued that the 
best way to deal with pirates was to stop them well away from the harbor, while others believed 
that pirates could be more effectively dealt with after they moved closer to the harbor because 
the waiyang (the sea space at greater depths in this case) was too vast to apprehend and crush 
                                                          
37 Ibid.  
 
38 Wu Bosen (ed.), Ming shilu leizuan: Shandong shiliao juan (Wuhan: Wuhan chubanshe, 1994), p. 397.  
 
39 Dengzhou fuzhi, pp. 142-143.  
 
40 Dengzhou fuzhi, pp. 134-135. 
 
41 Taiwan sheng wenxian weiyuanhui (ed.), Qingchu haijiang tushou (Nantou: Taiwan sheng wenxian weiyuanhui, 
1996), p. 11. P.S. This anonymous writing is preserved at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. It was reprinted by the 
Taiwan sheng wenxian weiyuanhui and entitled as the Qing chu haijiang tushou in 1996. 
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them. Once they spotted navy vessels, pirates could easily turn away and elude authorities.42 Not 
until the Yongzheng period (1722-35) was the Dengzhou navy given clearer instruction. As 
Huang Yuanxiang, the general of Dengzhou, has suggested, war junks only attacked pirates after 
they were spotted entering the harbor area.43 One of the logics of Qing defensive, known as the 
“land-sea protection strategy (hailu lianfang),” promoted cooperation between imperial navy 
vessels and paotai (barbettes) to destroy pirates. 
  
 Maritime militarization of Dengzhou underwent two waves of reform in 1714 and 1734. 
In 1714, the Kangxi emperor believed that “there was not much trouble on the sea” and the 
Bohai Gulf already could be effectively guarded by two other navies stationed in Fengtian and 
Tianjin. He then ordered the merging of the Dengzhou and Jiaozhou navies into one, called the 
Jiaozhou shuishi. The naval base in Dengzhou was thereafter moved to Jiaozhou, and the 
Jiaozhou shuishi became the only naval force to police the sea across northern and southern 
Shandong (nanbei fangqu). This relocation of the naval base to Jiaozhou diminished the military 
significance of Dengzhou. Altogether, for twenty years Jiaozhou functioned as the base to 
monitor all war junks operating in Shandong seas.44 This situation did not change until the 
Yongzheng emperor decided to re-elevate the maritime military structure in the Bohai region as 
well as the strategic importance of Dengzhou. Due to the gradual expansion of sea trade across 
the Bohai Gulf, the Yongzheng emperor implemented stronger military control to oversee 
domestic and overseas economic interactions there, especially interactions between the 
Shandong and Liaodong peninsulas.45 In fact, since Ming times, Shandong and Liaodong had 
long been considered two closely connected provinces. Tao Langxian, a governor of Shandong 
in the seventeenth century, once warned the imperial court that “Deng (Shandong) and Liao 
should not be governed separately.”46 Situated at the northern tip of the Shandong province near 
the Liaodong peninsula, Dengzhou’s location made it the preferred site to strengthen the ties 
between these two counties. As a consequence, in 1734 Yongzheng divided the Shandong navy 
into three divisions, with two divisions based in eastern Jiaozhou and the third based on “Mount 
Sheng (Shengshan)” at the eastern extremity of the Shandong peninsula. To ensure that the three 
divisions would fulfill their duties properly and collaboratively, the Yongzheng Emperor 
designated Dengzhou as the naval base to monitor and operate the three naval stations. This 
made the city a place where officials dealt with a wide range of logistical and administrative 
needs, such as personnel, revenues and expenses, shipbuilding administration, warehouses for 
weaponry, defense against intruders, training exercises, patrolling and seizing, military 
administration, and construction of barbettes, beacon-mounds, fortresses, as well as the levy 
                                                          
42 For further discussion, see Ng Chin-keong, “Maritime Frontiers, Territorial Expansion and Hai-fang during the 
Late Ming and High Ch’ing”, in Sabine Dabringhaus and Roderich Ptak (eds.), China and Her Neighbours: Borders, 
Visions of the Other, Foreign Policy, 10th to 19th Century (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1997), pp. 224-231. 
 
43 Dengzhou fuzhi, pp. 134-135. 
 
44 Ibid., p.142. 
 
45 Ibid., p. 134.  
46 Tao Langxian’s account is extracted from his Tao Yuanhui zhongcheng yiji, which is collected in Yu Hao (ed.), 
Ming Qing shiliao congshu (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2005), pp. 72-87. 
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system for law and order in ports and harbors. From then until the late eighteenth century, 
Dengzhou remained the center of navies in Shandong.47 
  
 Dengzhou’s strategic location continued to be highly valued in the mid-Yongzheng 
period. The Qing court established garrisons (wei) and military stations (suo) to guard the land 
and marine palisades. The wei-suo system along the coast was a pre-Manchu development that 
had existed in the Ming coastal defense system. The suo were subdivisions of the wei; and the 
wei and suo formed units of either battalions (qian hu suo) or companies (bai hu suo) that were 
actively involved in coastal defense.48 Under the wei-suo system, farmlands were provided to 
soldiers to promote self-sufficiency. Barbettes and beacon-mounds were constructed for 
protecting the littoral as well as sending warning signals along the coast. In 1726, the first set of 
barbettes along the coast of the Shandong Peninsula were built, when Emperor Yongzheng 
assigned his officials in Dengzhou to supervise the construction of barbettes in “Guangdong 
style.”49 From 1726 to 1732, twenty coastal barbettes were constructed in what is today Longkou 
Harbor, Taozi Bay, Shuangdao Harbor, Chaoyang Harbor, Rongcheng Bay, Yangyuchi Bay, 
Shidao Bay, Jinghai Bay, Tadao Island, and Sushan Island.50 Until the middle of the eighteenth 
century, the Beijing government continued to provide financial support to these barbettes, which 
worked collaboratively with the Shandong navy to protect the Bohai region. All of this indicates 
the strategic importance of Shandong and Dengzhou in defending against pirates, domestic 
rebels, and other potential intruders from the sea. 
 
 Large-scale sea patrols (huaixiao), or “military tours,” were launched annually in 
northern Shandong, most of which were monitored and operated by officials in Dengzhou. To 
get a complete picture of how the Qing court actualized its maritime militarization across the 
Bohai Sea, the boundaries of the Shandong navy patrols under the supervision of the Dengzhou 
authority deserves analysis. The Dengzhou fuzhi recorded that the navy patrolled 1,770 li of 
sea.51 The navy, which consisted of roughly 410 soldiers and 7 war junks, first departed from the 
Dengzhou naval base located in a harbor called “the bridge-mouth (Tianqiao kou). The navy then 
turned east and sailed all the way to the Mountain Sheng (Shengshan), the eastern limit of the 
maritime patrol. It then moved back to Dengzhou, passing the Temple Island, and continued to 
head west until reaching the mouth of the Daigu River (see figure 6). During peacetime, large-
scale sea patrols operated seven months a year, from March to September. This large-scale patrol 
cost the Qing court more than 10,000 liang annually, according to records. Figures 1, 2 and 3 
depict the patrol limit of the Dengzhou navy and large body of water of the Bohai Gulf it covered. 
The seas off of Shangdong and Liaodong were divided by a vertical line cutting across Temple 
Island. Although the vertical line drawn in figure 1 is not an actual dividing line drawn by the 
Qing government, according to the textual records in the Dengzhou gazetteer, we can assume 
that the islets located north of the Temple Island, namely the Gaoshan Island, Daqin Island, and 
Xiaoqin Island, were considered to be very far from Dengzhou. All of them were considered to 
                                                          
47 Dengzhou fuzhi, p. 135.  
 
48 Gu Yanwu, Tianxia junguo libing shu (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1995), juan 26, 17b. 
 
49 Dengzhou gugang shi, pp. 91-92.  
 
50 Zhao Erxun (ed.), Qingshi gao (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977), p. 4003. 
51 Dengzhou fuzhi, p. 135.  
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be in the outer sea “(waihai).” Based on Dengzhou’s naval capability, this island group was 
beyond its defense perimeter. 
 
Types of 
seascapes 
(xunbie汛別) 
Descriptions Strategic importance 
xian險 Seawaters between two isles Obstruct enemies (宜用把截) 
yao要 Seawaters where sailors found it most 
favorable to pass through 
Garrison (宜屯重兵) 
chong沖 Seawaters near the harbor or the coast Defense (宜用防守) 
hui會 Seawaters which connect all other type of 
seascapes 
The best location to set up the main 
camp for the commander (宜立軍
門) 
xian閑 The exit and entrance of currents The best location to construct forts 
(宜設堡墩) 
san散 Seawaters next to small isles, also suitable to 
anchor for a short period of time 
Police and patrol (宜用巡哨) 
yu迂 Seawaters where the direction of wind 
changes  
Observe enemies (宜用了望) 
pi僻 Seawater connects to river Scout (宜用偵探) 
 
Table 1. The eight different types of seawater (Shandong tongzhi [Yongzheng edition]) 
 
 
 
 
 17  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Patrol Limit of the Dengzhou Navy  
(Map: Qisheng yanhaitu; the 1880s edition) 
 
 A coastal map entitled Shandong Dengzhou zhenbiao shuishi qianying beixun haikou 
daoyu tu (hereafter daoyu tu; see figure 7) also provides us with valuable information about the 
large-scale sea patrol operated by the Dengzhou navy. According to the description provided by 
the Chinese Academy of Science, where the daoyu tu is now preserved, this coastal map was 
compiled under official supervision sometime between 1734 and 1842.52 It depicts the coastal 
situation of Dengzhou and portrays a series of significant islands off the Shandong coast. The 
paratextual materials written on the coastal map indicate the time required for the Dengzhou 
navy to reach those islands. It also shows the patrol limit of the navy. For instance, it mentions 
that “from Dengzhou to the western part of Bohai the navy must pass by several islands. It is a 
720 li journey. Once the navy reached the river mouth of Daigu, there would be the patrol limit 
and the dividing line between Shandong and Tianjin sea spaces.” 
 
                                                          
52  Sun Jingguo (ed.), Yu tu zhi yao: Zhongguo kexue yuan tushuguan cang Zhongguo gu ditu xulu (Beijing: 
Zhongguo ditu chubanshe, 2012), p. 382.  
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Figure 7. Shandong Dengzhou zhenbiao shuishi qianying beixun haikou daoyu tu 
 
 The practice of sending vessels from Dengzhou to patrol the Bohai Gulf continued during 
the early Qianlong era. In collaboration with the land forces, Dengzhou authorities were able to 
assemble war junks in Shandong in order to police and protect the Bohai region. The navy was 
also effective in attacking their targets within their patrol limit, thus preventing any intruding 
vessels from entering the northern coast of Shandong. By the late eighteenth century, patrol posts 
and forts equipped with weapons (from cannons to bows and arrows) dotted the coast. Most of 
the commanders in Dengzhou (Dengzhou zongbing) such as Shi Wenbing (?-1694), Huang 
Yuanji, and Dou Bin (1715-1802) were experienced and energetic in maintaining a competent 
navy. 53  Therefore, there is little doubt but that the Dengzhou navy gradually became more 
sophisticated through development between the Kangxi and mid-Qianlong eras.  
 
Dengzhou continued to serve as the military base monitoring the navies as well as 
assuming patrolling duties in Shandong. During the mid-Qianlong period (1742-1783), however, 
Dengzhou naval structure contracted, due to a long period of peace and the prolonged absence of 
pirates and domestic rebels from the sea. From 1742 to 1783, the Qianlong Emperor reduced the 
number of soldiers and war junks supervised by the Dengzhou office and failed to provide 
sufficient repairs and refinements for the remaining vessels.54 As a consequence, the marines 
                                                          
53 Dengzhou gugang shi, p. 92.  
 
54 Dengzhou fuzhi, pp. 143.  
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who served in the water force suffered from low morale and were often afraid of going to sea. 
Troops were not properly trained and some of the warships were not suitably equipped. These 
problems were not rectified until the Daoguang period. As Tuohunbu, the governor-general of 
Dengzhou, and Yu Ming, the commander of Dengzhou, describe in a joint memorial: 
 
In order to support the militarization in Zhili and Fengtian, it is essential to 
increase the numbers of soldiers in Dengzhou. Dengzhou is important because it 
is a strategic city where we can oversee a large body of seawater attached to 
Shandong and Fengtian. The strategic location of Dengzhou enables us to control 
the seaway from Japan to Tianjin, as well as the sea routes from Fengtian to Zhili. 
It is where we can attack pirates and prevent foreigners from entering the northern 
part of our empire. At present, we only have 187 soldiers stationed in Dengzhou, 
which is obviously insufficient to protect the country.”55  
 
The above memorial indicates that Dengzhou’s maritime military defenses were not developed 
after 1783. From then until the early nineteenth century, no significant effort was made to 
expand or consolidate its naval structure. While not neglecting the importance of the Bohai Gulf, 
the Qianglong Emperor relied on the navies stationed in Daigu and Fengtian to police and patrol 
the Bohai Sea, rather than expanding or fortifying the Dengzhou navy itself.56 Compared Daigu 
and Fengtian, which developed larger naval bases, Dengzhou was no longer as advanced as in 
previous decades. 
 
Trade and Commerce 
 
In the eighteenth century, Dengzhou was a trading port as well as a naval base  – although 
its military importance exceeded its economic importance. As of December 1683, two months 
after Taiwan was annexed by the Qing Empire, Kangxi decided to lift the ban on Chinese 
navigation overseas by opening at least 50 large and small coastal ports to sea trade.57 Together 
with Tianjin in Zhili, Ningbo in Zhejiang, Yuntaishan in Jiangsu, Zhangzhou in Fujian, 
Dengzhou was one of the port cities in northeastern China that was opened to maritime trade, 
where merchants could conduct business and reside in the city. This is inscribed on a stone 
erected in the Penglai Pavilion: “Dengzhou (in the Kangxi-Yongzheng period) was the door for 
foreign merchants to trade with us and for Chinese merchants to trade abroad.” Although a 
distinct customs office was never established in Dengzhou, the Dengzhou governor was assigned 
to regulate and supervise all manner of trading activities. Compared to newly opened sea ports in 
the south, which attracted large numbers of western and Southeast Asian traders, Dengzhou had 
a smaller volume of trade. This is largely because it was not profitable enough for western and 
Southeast Asian traders, coming mostly from the Strait of Malacca, to sail north if they could 
conduct their business in Canton. But this does not mean that Dengzhou lacked economic 
significance as a sea port in international trade at that time.  
                                                          
 
55 Qing shilu: Daoguang chao shilu, collected in DaQing lichao shilu (Taipei: Hualian chubanshe, 1964), juan 156.  
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57 Gang Zhao, The Qing Opening to the Ocean, p. 116.   
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 As briefly introduced in the previous section, Dengzhou had the good fortune of being 
located at the nexus of three important trade routes connecting Zhili, Liaodong, and Korea. The 
development of local commerce, ginseng trade, soybean paste production, and transportation 
during the eighteenth century contributed significantly to sustaining Dengzhou during this period 
and combined to revive its economy after the economic downturn of the late seventeenth century. 
Emperor Kangxi’s lifting the sea ban promoted the development of coastal ports by legalizing 
ocean shipping and permitting increased opportunities for maritime business. Kangxi’s 
proclamations also served to strengthen government control of trade and produce tax revenues. 
Among the new regulations, laws that monitored and taxed the newly legalized sea trade were 
rigorously enforced. The emperor issued this imperial edict in 1683,  
 
“Without a regular means of collection, levying duties would trouble maritime 
traders, who would be subject to extortion from customs officials. Therefore, it is 
necessary to establish the same system in coastal regions as in inland regions and 
appoint special officials to deal with related affairs.”58 
The Kangxi Emperor thus appointed two Manchu officials, Igeertu and Wushiba, as the first 
heads of the Guangdong (Guangzhou, Xiangshan, and Macau) and Fujian (Fuzhou, Nantai, and 
Xiamen) commissions, while two more customs offices were established in Zhejiang (Ningbo 
and Dinghai) and Jiangsu (Huating and Shanghai) over the subsequent three years. The 
establishment of the new customs structure suggests that the Qing was keenly aware that the 
trading patterns and dynamics of the maritime frontier were different from those of land and 
river regions.  
 
 Although Dengzhou was not one the four main customs bureaus opened in the Kangxi era, 
it was similar to the seaports where custom offices were located. The seafront was covered with 
warehouses encircled by storage yards. Surrounding them were competing companies 
established by Chinese managers and stock account intermediaries serving Korean and Japanese 
traders. As He Changling illustrated,  
  
Since the sea ban was lifted by the Kangxi Emperor, the seaways were widely 
opened to traders. Maritime traders, who intended to reach Tianjin and Fengtian, 
began to pass by/ stop by Dengzhou. Thousands of trading vessels and 
businessmen help flourished the seawater of Dengzhou, in which you could hardly 
find this prosperity in the past (henggu weiyou).59  
 
He Changling may be a bit exaggerated, but we are certain that the economy of Dengzhou was 
gradually reviving after the sea ban was lifted. Especially during the Qianlong period, when the 
eight trade routes were found along the coast, the seafront of Dengzhou was covered with 
warehouses encircled by storage yards. Surrounding them were companies established by 
                                                          
 
58 Cited from Jin Duanbiao, Liuhe zhen jilue, in Zhongguo xiangzhen zhi jichen (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 
1992), juan 3, 14b. This passage is translated by Gang Zhao.  
59 He Changling, Huangchao jingshi wenbian, juan 48, huzheng 23, “caoyun xia.” 
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Chinese managers and intermediaries serving Chinese from other provinces, and sometimes 
Korean, Manchu, and Japanese traders.60  
 
 
 The vessels anchored in Dengzhou were mostly sand junks (shachuan), which could 
carry up to 1,500 shi (or 90 tons, one shi being approximately 60 kg), medium-sized vessels with 
a capacity of 800 to 900 shi, and small boats with a capacity of only 400 to 500 shi.61 They 
carried fertilizer and soybeans from northern ports to Shanghai and took cotton textiles north. 
During the Yongzheng period, the sea route connecting Shandong and Shanghai was one of the 
most lucrative in north China sea trade. Zhang Zhongmin has estimated that, by the middle of the 
high Qing, the fertilizer trade alone amounted to more than two million taels annually.62 Yet, as 
discussed earlier, Dengzhou’s gradual decline in economic importance during the Qianlong era, 
due to its diminished military importance, must be kept in mind. Competing cities located in 
Northeast China, such as Tianjin, Jinzhou, Niuzhuang, and Jiaozhou, replaced it in importance.63 
For example, due to its proximity to seaports in Southern China, Jiaozhou gradually became the 
major port of entry and departure for produce and coastal traffic in what is today the East China 
Sea region.64 By the late eighteenth century, Jiaozhou also received imports from Korea and 
Japan. Items such as ginseng, bird nets, and seaweed from these countries.65 Dengzhou only 
regained its economic importance when the British required more port cities be opened for free 
trade in the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin.66  
 
 Throughout the eighteenth century, Dengzhou’s merchants (Dengshang) had high social 
status, like those in other notable port cities. The Dengzhou merchants, who were usually labeled 
“Denglai businessmen,” were active in important centers of trade along the coast of China. As 
the Dengzhou fuzhi and other provincial gazetteers record, “(Dengzhou merchants) are 
everywhere to pursue profits (min duo zhuli yu sifang).”67 Exploring both inland frontier regions 
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and troubled waters, the maritime merchants from Dengzhou trade with peoples across the Bohai 
region as well as the southern part of China, such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang.68 One of the most 
enduring legacies of Dengzhou merchants is perhaps the specific design of the merchant-vessel 
called dongchuan or dengyou. It is one of the merchant vessels in the eighteenth century with a 
specific design to safely sail across the Bohai Sea. In a recent study of Dengzhou merchants, Tan 
Hongan suggests that the invention of the dengyou represents a highly advanced economic 
network created by the Dengzhou merchants in the Qing period.69 The development of this ship 
was thus a unique symbol of Dengzhou merchants as well as of Dengzhou city.  
 
 Yet the reputation of Dengzhou merchants failed to sustain the city’s economic 
importance in the Bohai region in the late eighteenth century. The rise of other large port cities 
such as Tianjin and Lüshun overshadowed Dengzhou’s position.70 The city was no longer as 
busy as before and most of the Dengzhou merchants moved their bases elsewhere. Those 
interested in Bohai sea trade preferred to set up their businesses in Tianjin,71 while those favoring 
trade with southeastern China relocated to Jiaozhou. The harbor of Dengzhou thus stopped 
growing and the number of trading vessels anchored near shore declined to roughly 400 per 
year. 72  The city entered another wave of economic recession. Not until the mid-nineteenth 
century did the economic significance of the city rise again. After the Second Opium War, the 
British and the French forced the Qing court to open more treaty ports to accommodate the 
expanding trade in Asian markets. This time, European interest extended beyond China’s 
southeastern coast into the northeast—and specifically the Bohai zone. 73  Following their 
investigation of the Shandong peninsula, the British chose Dengzhou because of its manageable 
size (as with their choice of Hong Kong) and its proximity to the capital. Like the treaty ports in 
Southeast China, Dengzhou was witness to the incursion of high imperialism in China in 
particular and East Asia in general. 74  Along with Niuzhuang on the Liaodong peninsula, 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
67 Dengzhou fuzhi, p. 73.  
 
68 For details, see Sun Yunzhi, “Dengzhou shangren,” Yantai shifan xueyuan xue bao (zhexue shehui kexue ban), no. 
3 (1989), pp. 68-75.  
 
69  Tan Hongan, “Jingshi haimen Dengzhou gang,” Zhongguo jingying bao (25.08.2014). Online version: 
http://dianzibao.cb.com.cn/images/2014-08/25/52/2074d04c.pdf 
 
70 Man Bun Kwan, The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), 27-28.  
 
71 Most of the Dengzhou merchants moved their bases to Tianjin due to the many functions Tianjian was enjoying at 
that time. By virtue of its location on the Grand Canal, the river system of the North China plain, and various 
overland routes, Tianjin served an economic maritime hub in North China and became a far more diversified 
commercial center in East Asia. I would argue that Dengzhou merchants were one of the groups who catalyzed the 
rapid urbanization in Tianjin.   
 
72 Dengzhou gugang shi, p. 95. 
 
73 Alain Peyrefitte, Jon Rothschild (trans.), The Immobile Empire (London: Vintage Books, 1989, reprinted in 2013), 
p. 69. 
 
74 For Western imperialistic incursion in China, see Lydia H. Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in 
Modern World Making (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 70-107 (chapter 3: Figuring 
Sovereignty).  
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Dengzhou was one of the two treaty ports open to foreign traders in the Bohai zone. That 
extended transcultural interactions beyond the circle of trade with Korea and Japan to those of 
diverse and broad scope. The intercultural interactions that resulted from this are certainly 
worthy of investigation in future research.75  
 
Conclusion 
 
In his “On the Evolution of the Port City,” Rhoads Murphey eloquently argued that port 
cities are different from other inland and hinterland cities in terms of their economic, social, 
political and cultural development. For Murphey, the difference between a port city and other 
type of cities is predominately determined by the function of a port city (the port function). 
Murphey defines “port function” as follows:  
 
“The true port city by definition links very distant maritime spaces, and this is the 
reason for what is perhaps its most noticeable characteristic. Ports are inclusive, 
cosmopolitan, while the inland is much less varied, much more exclusive, single 
faceted rather than diverse…Port functions, more than anything else, make a city 
cosmopolitan…A port city is open to the world, or at least to a varied section of it. 
In it races, cultures, and ideas as well as goods from a variety of places jostle, mix, 
and enrich each other and the life of the city. The smell of the sea and the harbor, 
still to be found…in all of them, like the sound of boat whistles or the moving 
tides, is a symbol of their multiple links with a wider world, samples of which are 
present in microcosm within their own urban areas.”76 
By the end of the late eighteenth century, Dengzhou was most of the time considered to be 
“cosmopolitan,” open to the wider world, especially to the Northeast Asian market thronged with 
Chinese (from the north and the south), Korean, Japanese, Manchu, and sometimes Russian 
traders. Situated at the nexus of three important trade routes connecting Shandong, Zhili, 
Liaodong, and Korea, the seaborne economy of Dengzhou was deliberately monitored and 
supervised by the government. The development of ginseng trade, local commerce, and 
transportation contributed significantly to Dengzhou’s importance. Hundreds of ocean craft 
plowed the port of Denghou as their sails billowed in the winds that tied together transcultural 
interactions in Northeast Asia. Yet the dramatic rise of Tianjin and Jiaozhou in the late Qianlong 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
75 In their recent edited volume Asia Inside Out: Connected Places, Eric Tagliacozzo, Helen F. Siu, and Peter C. 
Perdue have argued that “commerce in early modern empires, as well as nation stats during colonial expansion, 
stimulated the circulation of material goods and migratory populations beyond regional or national boundaries. The 
institutions that profited from this commerce amassed great wealth, power, and ideological force but also provided 
unusual space for maneuver. The subsequent cultural fusion in regional arena has been well documented in material 
objects, moral geographies, language and cognitive maps, cultural intimacies, and in legal dilemmas. But the 
political ambiguities of these commercialized regions and the fluid cultural and political identities of those engaged 
with these places deserve more analysis.” See their Asia Inside Out: Connected Places (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 2015), pp. 6-7. Situating in such framework, the cultural and economic interactions between East 
and West found in nineteenth century Dengzhou could certainly help us expand the dynamics of the city itself as 
well as the greater Bohai region in the early modern period. 
 
76 Rhoads Murphey, “On the Evolution of the Port City,” in Frank Broeze (ed.), Brides of the Sea: Port Cities of 
Asia from the 16th-20th Centuries (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1989), p. 225.  
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era overshadowed the economic significance of Dengzhou, quickly displacing it as trading hubs 
of northeast Asia. Only after the British declared their interest in urbanizing Dengzhou in the 
mid-nineteenth century was economic development in the city revived. 
 
However, it must be noted that the “port function” of Dengzhou differed from other 
inland Chinese cities, not only in terms of trade and commerce, but in its unique military 
development—particularly in relation to port cities on China’s southeastern coast. On one hand, 
the geographical location of Dengzhou made it a natural port of call for travelers in Northeast 
Asia; on the other, its strategic location made it a magnet for the Qing administration to set up a 
naval base to protect the imperial region. As we have seen in this paper, the Qing court in the 
eighteenth century did not ignore the significance of Dengzhou as well as the Bohai Sea. By 
deploying vessels and sailors within the Dengzhou seawater, the government considered 
Dengzhou a strategic center to oversee the Bohai region, connecting three coastal provinces in 
northeastern China. In order to govern this piece of maritime territory thoroughly and 
deliberately, the Dengzhou navy was responsible for policing the region on a regular basis as 
well as monitoring and regulating all other naval stations. The maritime militarization project 
prior to the middle of the Qianlong period integrated Dengzhou into a military network 
connecting Zhili, Liaodong, and Shandong, the three provinces most significantly underlying 
Manchu government rule. Yet the military development of Dengzhou cannot be seen in isolation 
from its immediate environment. Dengzhou’s military importance gradually weakened during a 
long period of peace across the Bohai Sea. The Qianlong emperor thus reduced the number of 
soldiers guarding the Dengzhou naval base and came to rely more on the Daigu and the Fengtian 
navies to police the Bohai zone. As a consequence, Dengzhou’ maritime militarization in the late 
eighteenth century regressed from what it had been decades before.   
 
In studying the connection between China and the sea in the long eighteenth century, 
western historiography has long focused on port cities in southeast China. The scale of shipping 
along the northeastern coast was smaller than that along the southeastern coast because most of 
the East-West transactions took place in large coastal cities such as Canton, Amoy, and Fuzhou. 
Yet, to fully evaluate maritime policy during the high Qing and comprehend the coastal history 
of China, it is not enough to merely inquire into the significance of the southeastern region; the 
northeastern region, and the Bohai zone in particular, can hardly be ignored. Dengzhou is but one 
of the cities in that zone that deserves attention. The histories of Yingkou, Weihai, and 
Qinhuangdao, for instance, are equally worthy of investigation, especially now when the PRC 
government is earnestly developing the Bohai Seaway Strategic Project (BSSP; Huan Bohai 
jingji quan zhanglüe jihua). In order to get a relatively thorough picture of the history of Chinese 
port cities and China’s connection to the sea, I would like to take this opportunity, once again, to 
invite potential researchers to move northward in their research and not to confine themselves to 
the “Southeast China-centric” framework in studying the maritime history of late imperial China. 
I believe this is a constructive way to gain a better understanding of the history of coastal China 
as well as a comprehensive picture of maritime Asia in the early modern period. 
 
We should also try to go beyond the Asian setting by comparing port cities in Northeast 
China with those in the West. Although the two were certainly not identical in terms of political 
functions and economic significance, their “port functions” may have more in common than is 
recognized. The study of Dengzhou as both a military and commercial port city reminds me of 
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the chronicles of Sevastopol, a port city in Russia surrounded by the Black Sea. Both a naval 
base and a commercial port city in Russia, Sevastopol experienced serious ups and downs over 
the eighteenth century. Much the same occurred in Dengzhou at about the same time, following 
Emperor Qianlong’s decision to reduce the number of soldiers in the Dengzhou navy, which then 
led to the economic decline of the city. Such comparison may therefore serve as a window into 
the global history of urbanization of port cities in the pre-industrial era. By investigating these 
cases, we can understand how port cities experienced unique and similar patterns of urban 
development within different political, cultural, and economic contexts. This might also help 
trace the origin of “cosmopolitan features” that exist in the port cities of today’s globally 
connected economy. 
 
Chronicle of Dengzhou (1644-1840) 
 
 
1644 (Shunzhi yuan nian) Establishment of the Dengzhou naval base.  
 
1648  (Shunzhi 5 nian) Outbreak of the Yu Qi 于七 rebellion, soon supressed by the Qing  
court. 
 
1653  (Shunzhi 10 nian) The promulgation of the Liaodong zhaomin kaiken jiangli tiaoli 遼 
東招民開墾獎勵條例. A substantial number of migrants from 
Dengzhou migrated to the Liaodong peninsula.   
 
1654 (Shunzhi 11 nian) Some anti-Qing rebels were captured by the Qing in Dengzhou  
on their way to Chosŏn Korea. 
 
1659  (Shunzhi 16 nian) The Dengzhou minister Xu Kexian 許克先 began constructing the 
Dengzhou water castle (shuicheng 水城). 
 
1661 (Shunzhi 18 nian)  Expansion of the Dengzhou navy in numbers of soldiers and  
    battleships [the exact number is unknown]. 
 
1663 (Kangxi 2 nian) All islanders settling off the Shandong coast were forced to move  
back to the coast.  
 
1666 (Kangxi 5 nian) The Dengzhou and Laizhou patrolling zones (haifang dao 海防道)  
were combined into one patrolling zone named Deng-Lai dao 登萊
道. 
 
1681  (Kangxi 20 nian) The sea blockade policy was abolished. 
 
1684 (Kangxi 23 nian) He Changling 賀長齡 recorded that “Since the sea ban was lifted  
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by the Kangxi Emperor, the seaways were widely opened to 
traders. Maritime traders, who intended to reach Tianjin and 
Fengtian, began to stop by Dengzhou.” 
 
1698 (Kangxi 37 nian) A large scale famine occurred in Chosŏn. The Qing helped relieve  
the famine by shipping food and suppliers from Dengzhou. 
 
1703 (Kangxi 42 nian) Qingzhou was integrated into the Deng-Lai dao, and the Denglai  
dao was renamed the Deng-Lai-Qing dao 登萊青道. The maritime 
defense of these three places were merged into one coherent 
system. 
 
1704  (Kangxi 43 nian) The number of soldiers in the Dengzhou navy was increased by  
1200. The navy was divided into two specific teams: the “front 
team (qianying 前營),” and the “back team (houying 後營).” 
 
1706 (Kangxi 45 nian) In order to further expand the zone of policing, the qianying was  
relocated to Jiaozhou and renamed the Jiaozhou navy (Jiaozhou  
shuishi), whereas the houying continued to be stationed in 
Dengzhou. The qianying and houying navies were called the 
Shandong navy. 
 
1714 (Kangxi 53 nian) The number of soldiers in the houying navy was reduced by 700,  
and 10 vessels from Dengzhou were deployed to Lüshun.  
 
1715 (Kangxi 54 nian) Chen Shangyong 陳尚勇, the leader of an anti-Qing rebel force,  
led 3000 war junks (bird boat) intending to capture Dengzhou but 
was quickly supressed by the Shandong navy. 
 
1729 (Yongzheng 7 nian) The number of soldiers in the Shandong navy was increased [the  
number is unclear]. 
 
1734 (Yongzheng 12 nian) The Shandong navy was divided into three divisions, with two  
divisions based in eastern Jiaozhou and the third based on “Mount 
Sheng (Chengshan 成山)” at the eastern extremity of the 
Shandong peninsula. Dengzhou was the naval base to monitor and 
operate the three naval stations. 
 
1762  (Qianlong 27 nian) Xu Ji  徐績 was assigned to investigate the Dengzhou water castle.  
His report was entitled the Penglai ge yue shuicao ji蓬萊閣閱水
操記.   
 
1777  (Qianlong 42 nian) In order to maintain the safety of the Bohai Sea and resolve the  
problem of unlicensed merchant ships anchoring in Shandong, 
every kind of vessel entering the Dengzhou harbor had to go 
through a new inspection procedure. 
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1783 (Qianlong 48 nian) The emperor reduced the number of soldiers and war  
junks supervised by the Dengzhou office. 
 
1792  (Qianlong 57 nian) A severe famine occurred in Shandong, Dengzhou was one of the  
affected cities. 
 
1801  (Jiaqing 6 nian) Another famine occurred, generating starving refugees everywhere  
    in Dengzhou. 
 
1803 (Jiaqing 8 nian) People from Dengzhou were prohibited from migrating to  
    Liaodong via the Bohai Sea. 
 
1811 (Jiaqing 16 nian) Large scale drought occurred in Dengzhou, along with another  
    wave of economic depression. 
 
1812  (Jiaqing 17 nian) People from Dengzhou were once again prohibited from sailing  
    across the Bohai Sea and migrating to Liaodong.  
 
1816 (Jiaqing 21 nian) The naval structure of Dengzhou was strengthened. Two  
battleships from Gangzhou were relocated to Dengzhou. 
 
1818  (Jiaqing 23 nian) Extra fog guns (wupao 霧炮) were constructed in Temple Island. 
 
1819 (Jiaqing 24 nian) Reconstruction of the Penglai water castle began. 
 
1825 (Daoguang 5 nian) Dengzhou was selected as a checkpoint to oversee the official sea  
lane connecting north and south China, which was recently 
inaugurated by the Qing court. 
 
1831 (Daoguang 11 nian) The soldiers guarding the Dengzhou water castle were increased  
by roughly 1000. 
 
1832 (Daoguang 12 nian) A British vessel surveyed the topography and seawaters  
surrounding the Dengzhou harbor.  
 
1840 (Daoguang 20 nian) Outbreak of the First Opium War. More than 30 British battleships 
    entered Dengzhou seawater by force.  
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Glossary 
bai hu suo百户所 
Bohai quyu 渤海區域 
Bohai 渤海 
Chen Zhongshang 陳忠尚 
Dengshang 登商 
dengyou 登郵 
Dengzhou fuzhi 登州府志 
Dengzhou shuishi 登州水師 
Dengzhou登州 
diji minpin地瘠民貧 
dongchuan 東船 
Dou Bin竇璸 
Dushi fangyu jiyao 讀史方輿紀要 
fenjie  分界 
Gu Zuyu 顧祖禹 
Haifang zonglun 海防總論 
hailu lianfang 海陸聯防 
henggu weiyou   恆古未有 
houying 後營 
huaixiao 會哨 
Huan Bohai jingji quan zhanglüe jihua 環
渤海經濟圈戰略計劃  
Huang Yuanji黃元濟 
Jiang Chenying姜宸英 
Jiaozhou shuishi 膠州水師 
jingji 京畿 
Kong Youde 孔有德 
Laizhou萊州 
Miaodao 廟島 
min duo zhuli yu sifang 民多逐利於四方 
nanbei fangqu南北防區 
Ninghaizhou 寧海洲 
Niuzhuang牛莊 
paotai 炮台 
Penglai ge yue shuicao ji 蓬萊閣閱水操
記 
qian hu suo 千户所 
qianying 前營 
Qingzhou 青州 
Quanzhou 泉州 
Shachuan 沙船 
Shandong Dengzhou zhenbiao shuishi 
qianying beixun haikou daoyu tu山東登州
鎮標水師前營北汛海口島嶼圖 
Shengshan 成山 
taixi 泰西 
Tianqiao kou 天橋口 
tuntian nongmu 屯田農務 
waiyang 外洋 
weisuo 衛所 
Yu Qi 于七 
Yuntaishan 雲台山 
Zhangzhou漳州 
zongbing總兵 
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